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98 N.C. L. REV. 191 (2019)

To Abstain, or Not To Abstain, That Is the Question: The Seventh
and Ninth Circuits’ Divergent Approaches to Younger Abstention*
Federal abstention is a judicially created doctrine by which a federal court declines to
exercise its jurisdiction over a case and controversy properly before it. Abstention is
aimed at preserving the balance of sovereignty allocated to the states and federal
government as envisioned by the Framers. Of the various iterations of abstention,
Younger abstention perhaps does the most to protect this balance. Despite its importance
in maintaining principles of federalism, lower courts have struggled to come up with a
consistent approach to Younger. This Recent Development highlights two U.S. Circuit
Courts—the Seventh and Ninth—and their divergent approaches to Younger
abstention and proposes that the Seventh Circuit’s approach is correct as it effectively
advances the principles of federalism and comity that Younger abstention was designed
to protect in the first place.
What happens when a court declines to exercise the jurisdiction it has been
mandated1 to exercise? Congress gave the federal judiciary the power to
adjudicate state-law claims when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000
and the dispute is between parties who are domiciled—at “home”2—in different
states.3 Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires that any claims “arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” are properly filed in federal
district court.4 These statutes clearly establish when a federal court is granted
jurisdiction to adjudicate a controversy. However, courts are permitted to, and
in some cases must, decline jurisdiction pursuant to the judicially created
doctrine of abstention.5
Abstention may not be as well known as other judicially created doctrines
like judicial review6 or Erie,7 but it is certainly no less important and thus
requires consistent application among lower courts in the federal judiciary. The
* © 2019 Jessica O’Brien.
1. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We [the courts] have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”).
2. Domicile, BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).
4. See id. § 1331.
5. The doctrine of abstention, which has undergone many iterations, allows a federal court to
decline to hear a case within its jurisdiction. James Bedell, Note, Clearing the Judicial Fog: Codifying
Abstention, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 943, 945 (2018).
6. The doctrine of judicial review is typically covered in a basic constitutional law class through
study of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
7. First-year law students study the Erie doctrine, derived from Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), in a basic civil procedure class.
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doctrine’s importance is rooted in its aim “to preserve the balance between state
and federal sovereignty,”8 which is one of the guiding principles of our federal
republic.9 Without the ability to abstain, federal courts would be required to act
as a “quasi-foreign power,” interfering in state-law issues and likely causing
unnecessary tension between the state and federal governments.10
The Supreme Court first established abstention in Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Co.11 to further solidify the Court’s routine policy to decide
cases on narrow grounds and avoid making “unnecessary constitutional
decisions.”12 Once an abstention doctrine is invoked by a federal court, litigation
proceedings in the federal court are often paused or dismissed altogether.13
Plaintiffs are thus tasked with navigating the procedures, rules, and costs of not
one but two court systems. Because abstention orders are immediately
appealable, plaintiffs must bear the costs of the appeals process in federal court
and then again in state court if their appeal is unsuccessful.14 While abstention
may have furthered the balance between federal and state sovereignty,15 specific
forms of abstention provide unclear guidance as to when courts should decline
to exercise jurisdiction. As a result, lower courts are increasingly split in their
applications of the doctrines.16
One such split in the circuit courts concerns Younger abstention. In
particular, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits diverge.17 Younger abstention is a
form of abstention by which a federal court declines to exercise its jurisdiction

8. Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court Intervention,
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1102 (1998).
9. Federalism serves as the primary justification for abstention. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at
236 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
10. See Drew Alan Hillier, Note, The Necessity of an Equity and Comity Analysis in Younger
Abstention Doctrine, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2014) (“When a federal court invalidates a state law,
the state’s citizens and government officials might bristle at the federal court’s interference. To the
state legislator, the federal court represents a quasi-foreign power that need not have earned the
approval of the state legislature, executive, or judiciary. The abstention doctrines also help federal
courts to avoid erroneous interpretations of state law and unnecessary constitutional rulings.”).
11. 312 U.S. 496 (1941); see id. at 501 (“This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts
in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority . . . .”).
12. Thomas G. Buchanan, Note, Pullman Abstention: Reconsidering the Boundaries, 59 TEMP. L.Q.
1243, 1243 (1986).
13. See Staver, supra note 8, at 1102; see also Bedell, supra note 5, at 952, 957–58 (explaining that
some forms of abstention require a full dismissal of the case from federal courts, while others require
only a stay in the federal court proceedings while the state issues are handled in state court).
14. See Bedell, supra note 5, at 957–58.
15. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
16. For example, there is no clear answer as to whether abstention is mandatory or permissive.
See Bedell, supra note 5, at 960. Furthermore, the Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all
adhere to one test in determining when Pullman abstention is appropriate, while the Fifth Circuit
adheres to a different test. See id. at 960–61.
17. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
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to further the “principles of comity and federalism.”18 The Seventh Circuit’s
November 2018 decision in Courthouse News Service v. Brown,19 created a split
with the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Courthouse News Service v. Planet.20
Both cases dealt with an allegation that state court filing procedures abridged
the First Amendment rights of the Courthouse News Service (“CNS”)
organization, specifically the right of public access to judicial proceedings.21 The
Ninth Circuit opted not to abstain because the plaintiff’s claims “raise[d] novel
and important First Amendment questions that the federal courts ought to
decide.”22 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, opted to abstain because
“considerations of equity, comity, and federalism” mandated abstention.23 This
Recent Development will analyze the split between the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits; explain how the two circuits came to opposite conclusions on a nearly
identical issue; and argue the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied Younger
abstention, thus creating needless confusion within its own circuit and severely
undermining the original purpose of Younger abstention—the preservation of
comity and federalism.
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I delves into the abstention doctrines
applied in both Planet and Brown and explains how each court reached its
decision. Part II provides analysis as to why the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Brown was the correct decision and how the Ninth Circuit seemingly ignored
the purpose of Younger abstention in its improper application of the doctrine.
Finally, Part III discusses the implications of this circuit split and considers the
future of Younger abstention.
I. THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE
Federal abstention is the doctrinal mechanism by which federal courts
decline to exercise constitutional or statutory jurisdiction24 in deference to state

18. George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide—Rethinking Younger
Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 115–16 (1990) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 602 (1975)). The exact definition of comity is hard to pin down, see Thomas Schultz & Niccolò
Ridi, Comity in US Courts, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 280, 285–88 (2018), but generally it “encompasses the
notion that, based on judicial courtesy and deference, the courts of one jurisdiction will give credit and
effect to the laws and judicial holdings of courts from another jurisdiction,” Staver, supra note 8, at 1116
n.84 (citing Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 349 (1930)).
19. 908 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2018), cert denied, No. 18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15,
2019).
20. 750 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2014).
21. See Brown, 908 F.3d at 1065; Planet, 750 F.3d at 779.
22. Planet, 750 F.3d at 793.
23. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1075.
24. See Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention
Doctrines Will Always Be With Us—Get Over It!!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375, 375–76 (2003).
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court proceedings.25 The circumstances in which the need for such deference
arise are incredibly limited.26 Abstention is typically regarded as “the exception,
not the rule.”27 Despite the infrequency with which abstention is applied, there
are at least four clearly identifiable abstention doctrines.28 While each doctrine
applies in distinct circumstances, all types of abstention are justified by the same
general idea: federalism.29 Federalism—the sharing of authority over one
geographical area by multiple, coequal, governmental units30—serves as the
primary justification for all variations of abstention, but perhaps none more so
than Younger abstention.
Younger abstention ensures that federal courts “refrain from hearing
constitutional challenges to state actions under . . . circumstances in which
federal action is regarded as an improper intrusion on the right of a state to
enforce its laws in its own courts.”31 The doctrine originated in Younger v.
Harris32 in which the Supreme Court reversed an order by a federal district
court enjoining the California Attorney General from criminally prosecuting
the respondent under a California state law that was “void for vagueness and
overbreadth in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”33 The
Court’s decision focused primarily on policy concerns, namely Congress’s
“desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal
courts”;34 notions of comity, which recognize “proper respect for state
25. Marie R. Yeates, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
§ 1:65, at 86 (Robert L. Haig ed., 4th ed. 2016).
26. Indeed, “federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon
them by Congress.” Quakenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996).
27. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). Federal
courts are typically regarded as having a “duty . . . to adjudicate a controversy properly before [them].”
Id. (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)).
28. Birdsong, supra note 24, at 377. The other three clearly identifiable abstention doctrines—not
relevant to this Recent Development—are Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, and Colorado River
abstention. See generally Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. 800; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315 (1943); R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman abstention is appropriate
when “state action is being challenged in federal court as contrary to the . . . Constitution, and there
are questions of state law that may be dispositive of the case.” CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & M ARY K AY
KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 292 (8th ed. 2017). Burford abstention is ordered, and the
case dismissed from the federal docket, when trying to “avoid needless conflict with the administration
by a state of its own affairs.” Id. at 296. Colorado River abstention is utilized to “address specific
situations involving parallel litigation” in state courts. Bedell, supra note 5, at 955.
29. See Birdsong, supra note 24, at 376 (citing Staver, supra note 8, at 1102).
30. Scott
Michael
Rank,
What
Is
Federalism?,
HISTORY
ON
NET,
https://www.historyonthenet.com/what-is-federalism [https://perma.cc/9VAJ-K8BU].
31. Birdsong, supra note 24, at 377 (emphasis added) (quoting WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 28,
at 306). Some situations in which Younger abstention is required to prevent a federal court from
improperly intruding on a state’s rights include civil actions, state criminal proceedings, and
administrative actions. See Brown, supra note 18, at 119–20.
32. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at 43.
IN FEDERAL COURTS
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functions”;35 and a “belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways.”36 The Court referred to these concerns as “Our
Federalism” and noted that “Our Federalism . . . occupies a highly important
place in our Nation’s history and its future.”37
Younger abstention has been expanded and curtailed numerous times by
the Court,38 but it has always maintained its original purpose: ensuring that
federal courts respect the boundaries of our federal republic and do not usurp
states’ rights. These federalism concerns can be said to underlie each type of
abstention, but Younger is perhaps the most consequential as it is the most
widely applied.39
A.

The O’Shea “Subcategory” of Younger Abstention

Given the relative frequency with which Younger has been applied, and
therefore expanded,40 it is no surprise that the doctrine has become rather
amorphous. One such expansion arguably occurred in O’Shea v. Littleton,41 when
the Supreme Court addressed Younger abstention despite dismissing the case on
other grounds.42 In O’Shea, residents of Illinois sued two state court judges who
had allegedly engaged in a “pattern and practice of conduct . . . which assertedly
deprived [the residents] . . . of their rights under the Constitution.”43 The state
residents sought injunctive relief in federal court, hoping the district court
would enjoin the state judges from engaging in unconstitutional bond setting,
issuing discriminatory criminal sentences, and requiring payments for jury
trials.44 The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the
complaint did not allege an “actual case or controversy.”45 However, after
35. Id. at 44.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 44–45.
38. See generally Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986)
(holding that Younger abstention can be appropriate in quasi-judicial state administrative proceedings);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (dropping the requirement that the state is a party in the litigation);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (applying Younger to state civil proceedings); Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (expanding Younger to federal declaratory relief).
39. See Brown, supra note 18, at 115 (citing Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional
Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 336 (1989) (stating that
Younger is the broadest of the abstention theories)).
40. David Mason, Note, Slogan or Substance? Understanding “Our Federalism” and Younger
Abstention, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 852, 871–76 (1988).
41. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). As this Recent Development will argue, O’Shea was not intended to be
and is not currently an illustrative application of Younger and should not be considered by lower courts
when applying Younger. See infra Part II.
42. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 489.
43. Id. at 488.
44. Id. at 492.
45. Id. at 493.
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spending significant time explaining the plaintiffs’ lack of standing46 (and thus
a lack of jurisdiction), the Court went on to discuss why the Younger abstention
doctrine would compel dismissal of the complaint even if the standing
requirements were met.47
O’Shea’s discussion of Younger abstention was a direct reproach to the lower
court’s decision that equitable relief would be appropriate, noting that the order
the district court would have imposed would have likely interfered with the
state proceedings.48 The Court was unequivocal in stating that “[t]his seems to
us nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state . . . proceedings which
would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris . . .
and related cases sought to prevent.”49 While the Court’s condemnation of an
injunction requiring “continuous supervision by the federal court” and
“monitoring of the operation of state court functions”50 was incredibly clear, the
precedential value of this discussion is less so.
Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence that, while he agreed with the
majority’s finding that the plaintiffs had failed the standing requirement, the
“additional discussion” of whether Younger abstention was appropriate was
nothing more than an “advisory opinion that [the Court was] powerless to
render.”51 In a word, the Court’s discussion regarding Younger abstention and its
underlying principles was merely dicta.52 Despite the clear nonbinding effect of
the abstention discussion, the Ninth Circuit’s Planet decision failed to
sufficiently consider federalism and comity and instead expanded Younger
abstention by incorrectly giving O’Shea binding precedential consideration.53
B.

The Ninth Circuit’s Application of Younger Abstention

In Planet, the Ninth Circuit overturned the Central District of California’s
decision54 to abstain under Younger from hearing the merits of a case challenging
the constitutionality of a state court’s filing procedures.55 CNS, a news agency

Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 493–99.
Id. at 499–504.
See id. at 500.
Id.
Id. at 501. Notably, the Court specifically highlighted the principle of comity in its discussion.

51. Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
52. Dicta is “an opinion by a court on a question that is directly involved, briefed, and argued by
counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that is not essential to the decision and therefore not
binding even if it may later be accorded some weight.” Judicial Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
53. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 789–792 (9th Cir. 2014).
54. The district court, and thus the Ninth Circuit, technically abstained under O’Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974), which, according to the Ninth Circuit, is an extension of Younger, see Planet, 750
F.3d at 789.
55. See Planet, 750 F.3d at 779.
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that reviews court complaints and reports of civil lawsuits,56 covers courthouses
all over the country.57 Beginning in 2010, it began reporting daily on the lawsuits
filed in Ventura County Superior Court for the State of California.58 The court,
however, withheld complaints until they were fully processed by the clerk’s
office, effectively preventing CNS reporters from accessing newly filed
complaints without delay.59 CNS filed its lawsuit in federal district court
seeking injunctive relief to require the Ventura County Superior Court to
ensure immediate or near-immediate access to complaints.60 CNS’s claim was
based on the theory that withholding the complaint “violate[d] [CNS’s] right
of access . . . under the First Amendment.”61 The district court dismissed on the
basis of Younger abstention,62 but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.63
After de novo review, the Ninth Circuit found the district court had
improperly abstained under Younger. In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit erroneously used O’Shea as a conduit for its analysis.64 Looking to its
own prior interpretation of “O’Shea abstention,” the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
ignored the importance of comity and federalism in a Younger analysis, and
instead created a relatively bright-line rule: “O’Shea abstention is inappropriate
where the requested relief may be achieved without an ongoing intrusion into
the state’s administration of justice, but is appropriate where the relief sought
would require the federal court to monitor the substance of individual cases on
an ongoing basis to administer its judgment.”65
With the creation of the “O’Shea abstention” rule, the court reasoned that
the plaintiff’s requested relief—an injunction preventing the defendant from
maintaining filing procedures that resulted in delayed access to newly filed civil
complaints—would not require an “ongoing federal audit” of the state court.66
The federal court suggested various procedures the state court could adopt to
ensure compliance with a federal order granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff,
such as keeping preprocessed complaints in a locked room and giving a key to
56. Id. at 780.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 781.
59. See id. at 781–82. Specifically, the court limited reports to “viewing twenty-five complaints
each day” and withheld complaints until they had been fully processed. Id. at 781. In one instance, one
CNS reporter was prevented from accessing civil complaints for up to thirty-four days. Id. at 782.
60. See id. at 779. CNS took issue with the state court’s withholding of complaints for “days or
weeks,” depending on the processing time. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, No. CV11-08083 R (MANx), 2011 WL 11715054, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011), rev’d, 750 F.3d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 2014).
63. Planet, 750 F.3d at 779.
64. Id. at 789.
65. Id. at 790. This rule was developed by reading two prior Ninth Circuit cases in tandem. See
E.T. v. Cantil-Sakauye, 682 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2012); L.A. Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d
697, 703 (9th Cir. 1992).
66. See Planet, 750 F.3d at 790–91.
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CNS reporters or allowing the reporters to view cover pages of complaints and
request further access to newsworthy cases, neither of which would require an
ongoing federal audit.67
However, the court casually dismissed the realistic concerns that the state
court would not sufficiently comply with a federal injunction and simply noted
that it “trust[ed]” the state court.68 The Ninth Circuit asserted that further
federal proceedings to ensure compliance—an ongoing federal audit, of sorts—
would be unlikely.69 The court concluded its opinion by noting that the “First
Amendment issues . . . may be adjudicated . . . in federal court, where they
belong.”70 Notably absent from the Planet decision, however, was any substantial
discussion of the principles underlying Younger or “O’Shea abstention.”71 The
Ninth Circuit’s failure to consider comity and federalism betrays its underlying
belief that state courts are less fit to adjudicate First Amendment claims than
are the federal courts—a belief which is squarely at odds with Younger and the
concept of “Our Federalism”:
[Our Federalism] represent[s] . . . a system in which there is sensitivity
to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and
in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States.72
C.

The Seventh Circuit’s Application of Younger Abstention

In Brown, the Seventh Circuit was presented with a situation similar to
that in Planet, albeit with an opposite procedural posture. The court reversed
the district court’s refusal to abstain from hearing the merits of a challenge to
an Illinois state court’s filing procedures.73 CNS had brought suit against the
Cook County Clerk’s Office (“Clerk’s Office”) contesting filing procedures that
led to delays in CNS reporters’ access to newly filed civil complaints.74 From
2009 to 2015, the Clerk’s Office filing procedures allowed same-day access to
electronically filed complaints, but in 2015, the Clerk’s Office began
67. See id. at 791 (explaining that the state court could give CNS reporters a “key to a room where
new complaints are placed in boxes for review . . . [or] place paper versions of new complaints in a
secure area behind the counter . . . [or] allow a credentialed reporter . . . to go behind the counter and
pick up a stack of papers that already exists”).
68. Id. at 792.
69. See id. at 791–92.
70. Id. at 793.
71. See infra Part II.
72. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971).
73. Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1065–66 (7th Cir. 2018), cert denied, No.
18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019).
74. See id. at 1066.
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withholding the electronically filed complaints from both reporters and the
public until they were fully processed and officially accepted by the court.75 The
new administrative process led to delays in access of usually no more than one
business day.76
In 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court mandated electronic filing of all
complaints in Illinois state courts, presumably leading to delays in access to
newly filed complaints in all civil cases.77 In anticipation of these delays, CNS
attempted to negotiate with the Clerk’s Office in hopes of coming to a mutually
beneficial arrangement that would allow for more immediate access to
electronically filed complaints.78 However, CNS was unsuccessful: the filing
procedures remained the same, and CNS sued in federal district court.79 As in
the Planet decision, CNS’s claim in Brown was premised on violations of the
public’s right of access to judicial proceedings under the First Amendment.80
However, unlike in Planet, the district court refused to abstain under Younger,
and the Seventh Circuit reversed.81
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to abstain under Younger was “ultimately
base[d] . . . on the more general principles of federalism that underlie all of the
abstention doctrines.”82 The court acknowledged that Younger abstention did
not neatly align with the facts at issue in the case at bar,83 but that the O’Shea
extension of the Younger doctrine compelled abstention.84 The Seventh Circuit

75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Prior to this mandate, complaints filed in hard copy format were presumably accessible
the same day they were filed. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1066–67.
80. Id. at 1065.
81. Id. at 1066.
82. Id. at 1071; see supra text accompanying note 29; see also Staver, supra note 8, at 1102 (noting
that the purpose of the abstention doctrines is to preserve the balance between federal and state
sovereignty). The general principles of federalism and comity were ultimately the impetus for the
various iterations of abstention—different cases and situations demanded different levels of respect for
state interests over federal interests and vice versa. See Birdsong, supra note 24, at 376. Furthermore,
the Seventh Circuit pointed to the state courts’ need to “work[] through . . . implementation challenges
and resource limitations” associated with altering their complaint filing procedures. Brown, 908 F.3d
at 1074. The court also noted that federal oversight would be required if the state court clerk did not
comply with a federal injunction as additional justification for abstaining. See id.; cf. Courthouse News
Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2014) (failing to consider similar implementation challenges
and resource limitations that the state court may need to work through).
83. See Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072. Younger abstention has traditionally been found to be appropriate
only in cases where there is a pending state proceeding. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
705 (1992) (“Absent any pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore, application by the lower courts
of Younger abstention was clearly erroneous.”). In Brown, no state proceeding had been initiated. See
Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072.
84. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072–73. The court also discussed an extension of Younger and its
underlying principles. Id. at 1073 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–79 (1976)). However, as
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highlighted that the O’Shea Court relied on the principles underlying the
Younger doctrine when it noted in dicta that the federal judiciary should abstain
in situations where an injunction would require an “ongoing federal audit,”
which would be inconsistent with notions of federalism and comity.85
The Seventh Circuit noted abstention was warranted because the relief
sought by CNS was “simply too high” a level of intrusion into state court
operations—Younger compelled “the assumption that state courts are co-equal
to the federal courts and are fully capable of respecting and protecting CNS’s
substantial First Amendment rights.”86 It was the Seventh Circuit’s accurate
understanding that “cooperation and comity, not competition and conflict”
most effectively further the “federal design” envisioned by the Framers.87 The
Seventh Circuit acknowledged its conclusion directly contradicted that of the
Ninth Circuit88:
[W]e respectfully disagree with our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit. If
the state court clerk refuses or fails to comply with the federal court’s
injunction or complies only partially, the federal court’s involvement
would certainly continue as it oversees the implementation of its order.
Further, we have no doubt CNS would attempt to use a different
decision in this case to force the hand of other state courts that do not
provide immediate press access to court filings. This would likely lead to
subsequent litigation in the federal courts. We want to avoid a situation
in which the federal courts are dictating in the first instance how state
court clerks manage their filing procedures and the timing of press
access. We also want to avoid the problems that federal oversight and
intrusion of this sort might cause.89
The court thus assessed the realistic implication that a federal injunction against
a state court could create an ongoing federal audit and correctly decided that
such an injunction “would run contrary to the considerations of equity, comity,

this case is not at issue in Planet, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of Rizzo will not be discussed in this
Recent Development.
85. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499–500 (1974)).
86. Id. at 1074.
87. Id.
88. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits seem to have differing opinions on the capabilities of state
courts to understand and apply federal law. Given this difference, it is perhaps more understandable
why the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the underlying principles of the Younger abstention doctrine;
indeed, there is only a single reference to notions of comity in the Planet decision. See Courthouse
News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 2014).
89. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1074–75. The Seventh Circuit further noted that, because its decision
would create a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit, it circulated the opinion to all judges in active
service. Id. at 1075 n.6. None requested to rehear the case en banc. Id.
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and federalism,”90 and “unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States.”91
II. WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT WAS WRONG
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Planet that abstention was improper
illustrates an incorrect application of the Younger doctrine. Both the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits relied heavily on O’Shea in their analyses; however, only the
Seventh Circuit characterized O’Shea’s discussion of Younger abstention as
simply an “extension” of the principles underlying Younger abstention.92 While
the Seventh Circuit properly used the abstention dicta in O’Shea as an
influential, nonbinding93 guide, and focused instead on the core principles of
the Younger doctrine, the Ninth Circuit treated O’Shea as binding precedent,
thus completely disregarding the original purposes for the abstention doctrines.
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit regarded O’Shea as standing solely for the
proposition that abstention is mandatory when “the plaintiff seeks an ‘ongoing
federal audit’ of the state judiciary, whether in criminal proceedings or in other
respects.”94 This misses the point of O’Shea in two respects: first, the Ninth
Circuit entirely ignored that the primary issue in O’Shea was the plaintiff’s lack
of standing and that the abstention discussion was merely dicta;95 and second,
the court ignored O’Shea’s insistence that “monitoring . . . state court functions
[would be] antipathetic to established principles of comity.”96 The Ninth
Circuit’s handling of O’Shea stands in contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s
treatment where the court acknowledged, albeit briefly, that O’Shea’s holding
rested on a lack of standing, not Younger abstention; yet, the Seventh Circuit
nonetheless acknowledged that the O’Shea Court’s treatment of Younger
required an analysis of comity and federalism.97 By briefly highlighting the
actual holding of O’Shea and acknowledging O’Shea’s discussion of comity and
90. Id. at 1075.
91. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).
92. Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072.
93. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
94. Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 790 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting E.T. v. CantilSakauye, 682 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2012)).
95. See supra notes 46–47, 52 and accompanying text. Moreover, numerous law review articles
extensively discuss Younger abstention and none treat O’Shea as an extension or subset of Younger. See,
e.g., James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1049, 1084–92 (1994). See generally Beth Shankle Anderson, “Our Federalism” The Younger
Abstention Doctrine and Its Companions, 81 FLA. B.J. 9–10, 12, 14 (2007) (explaining the Younger doctrine
and its major expansions and curtailments, none of which include O’Shea).
96. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501 (1974).
97. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 2018), cert denied, No.
18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019) (“The Supreme Court [in O’Shea] . . . reversed this
court, finding that the claims were not ripe because there was an insufficient probability that the
plaintiffs would be brought before the . . . courts again on criminal charges.”).
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federalism, the Seventh Circuit properly contextualized O’Shea’s abstention
discussion as dicta, which is intended to be “influential,” but “[has] no direct
precedential weight.”98 Because the Seventh Circuit treated O’Shea as
influential rather than binding, it retains a level of flexibility unavailable to the
Ninth Circuit as a result of treating O’Shea as a bright-line rule that incorrectly
ignores consideration of comity and federalism.99
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, some lower courts treat “all considered
statements” by a higher court, dicta or otherwise, as binding.100 As such, it can
be fairly argued that the Ninth Circuit treated O’Shea’s abstention dicta as
binding in a prudent move to avoid being overruled.101 Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit subsequently relied on O’Shea in holding that abstention was proper in
Miles v. Wesley.102 There, the Ninth Circuit was presented with a group of
plaintiffs who sued in federal court seeking an injunction to prevent the Los
Angeles County Superior Court from consolidating tenant eviction actions into
“hub courts.”103 The consolidation plan was part of a larger restructuring of the
state court system due to budget cuts, and the plaintiffs argued that the
consolidation plan would “disproportionately impact[] poor, disabled, and
minority residents” under a variety of statutes and constitutional provisions.104
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim
on the basis of “O’Shea abstention,” reasoning that the plaintiffs’ requested
injunction would require the type of “‘heavy federal interference in . . . state
activities . . .’ that Younger and O’Shea sought to prevent.”105 In conclusion, the
court again framed O’Shea in terms of binding precedent, which ignored comity
and federalism, rather than influential dicta, noting that “[t]he district court
properly abstained under O’Shea.”106
98. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2006 (1994).
99. Notably, the Younger abstention doctrine was born out “of the flexible resources of equitable
discretion.” See Rehnquist, supra note 95, at 1109 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971);
and then citing R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)). This suggests that Younger
was not intended to serve as a rigid framework for lower courts to follow. In fact, the Supreme Court
has expressed this sentiment. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987) (“The various
types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather,
they reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that
contemplates parallel judicial processes.”).
100. Dorf, supra note 98, at 2026.
101. See id. Beyond simply embarrassing a lower court in its incorrect application of the law,
overruling a decision by a lower court has important legal implications, particularly regarding
retroactive application of legal rules imposed by a higher court. For a description of the legal
implications for parties involved in a controversy where a decision is overruled, see generally James A.
Spruill, Jr., The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C. L. REV. 199 (1940).
102. 801 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015).
103. Id. at 1061 (defining hub courts as “specialized courts that hear only one type of case”).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1064 (quoting L.A. Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1992)).
106. Id. at 1066.
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The Ninth Circuit’s recommitment to O’Shea as a standalone abstention
doctrine in Miles suggests that the court was indeed treating the abstention dicta
in O’Shea as binding insofar as it indicated what the Supreme Court would have
done if presented with the abstention issue under the same facts as O’Shea.107
However, the facts in Miles are very similar to those in Planet108—thus, the
effectiveness of utilizing “O’Shea abstention” should be called into question
because of the differing results in each case.109
The anomalous result—an intra-circuit split—in the Ninth Circuit
demands the question: What happened? Although the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
applied O’Shea instead of Younger in both Miles and Planet, the Miles court’s
correct decision to abstain suggests the Ninth Circuit does understand that
Younger abstention—or any derivation therefrom—requires a flexible, but
intentional, analysis of comity and federalism.110 Such analysis mandates a
federal court to use its discretion to determine if the particular controversy
demands restraint from interfering in legitimate state interests.111 A flexible and
intentional analysis is impossible with the rigid rule taken from O’Shea112 and
used in Planet, which allows courts to base their abstention decision on whether
or not they can come up with a set of procedures that would not, in the court’s
opinion, require an ongoing federal audit.
Thus, the problem with the inconsistent application in Miles and Planet
results in a predicament for lower courts in the circuit: When considering
Younger abstention, does the analysis require application of the more relative
bright-line rule that ignores comity and federalism as applied in Planet or
application of the flexible concepts of comity and federalism? To answer this
question, lower courts in the Ninth Circuit—and perhaps the Ninth Circuit
itself—should look to the heart of Younger abstention, as illustrated by Supreme
Court precedent,113 or to the Seventh Circuit’s thorough analysis of comity and
107. See Dorf, supra note 98, at 2026 (noting that a lower court can reasonably “view the higher
court’s dicta as a fairly reliable prediction of what the higher court would do if it actually had to decide
the question previously addressed only in dictum”).
108. Both cases concern a plaintiff who is suing a state court defendant for violations of
constitutional protections in hopes of achieving a federal injunction mandating the actions of a state
judiciary’s administrative procedures and allocation of its resources. Compare Miles, 801 F.3d at 1060,
with Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2014).
109. In Miles, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to abstain under Younger and
O’Shea. See Miles, 801 F.3d at 1061. In Planet, the Ninth Circuit reversed, abstaining under Younger and
O’Shea. Planet, 750 F.3d at 779.
110. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 86–87. “This analysis . . . must outweigh federal
adjudications.” Birdsong, supra note 24, at 376; see supra text accompanying notes 105–06.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 94.
113. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989)
(explaining that the Court’s decision in Younger rested on the “‘more vital consideration’ of comity”
(quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971))). Some commentators have noted that “[t]he idea
that contemporary Younger abstention is based on anything other than abstract notions of comity or
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federalism, which easily conforms to what the Supreme Court envisioned when
it established Younger abstention.114
III. THE FUTURE OF COMITY AND FEDERALISM IN THE NINTH AND
SEVENTH CIRCUITS
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to consider notions of federalism and comity
in Planet undermines the purposes the Supreme Court sought to achieve in
developing Younger abstention, particularly when contrasted with the Seventh
Circuit’s decision, which sought to further effectuate those notions in the
Seventh Circuit. This circuit split will likely create unclear boundaries between
state courts’ power and federal courts’ ability to address state interests even
when premised on questions of federal law. It is not difficult to envision a
situation in which tension, conflict, and competition will arise between a state
and its federal counterpart if notions of federalism and comity are abandoned.
Indeed, it is precisely this fear that lead the Supreme Court to develop
abstention in the first place.115 In Younger, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of “a proper respect for state functions” and recognized “that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments.” 116
Subsequently, in Brown, the Seventh Circuit relied on its own precedent in
highlighting the importance of comity and federalism in a Younger analysis,117
indicating that comity and federalism are firmly embedded in the Seventh
Circuit’s Younger jurisprudence.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, dismissed comity and federalism
when it failed to abstain and concluded its opinion by noting that First
Amendment claims belong in federal court, revealing its failure to give proper
respect to state functions.118 Where the Seventh Circuit addressed the
arguments against applying Younger abstention, and thus sought to use O’Shea
as influential,119 the Ninth Circuit quickly disposed of the arguments in favor of
abstention and turned to an erroneous bright-line rule.120 Further, in a

federalism should be rejected.” Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical
Perspective, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 8 (2011).
114. See Birdsong, supra note 24, at 382 (stating comity and federalism lay “at the heart” of the
Younger decision).
115. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.
116. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
117. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018), cert denied, No.
18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019) (explaining the “importan[ce] for federal courts to
have ‘a proper respect for state functions’” (quoting SKS & Assocs., Inc., v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 678
(7th Cir. 2010))).
118. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
119. See Brown, 908 F.3d at 1072 (“The situation here is not a traditional Younger scenario: there
is no individual, ongoing state proceeding that plaintiffs seek to enjoin.”).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65, 94.
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subsequent case, the Ninth Circuit did emphasize comity and federalism,121 thus
creating an intra-circuit split. As such, it is unclear as to whether comity and
federalism have a part to play in the Ninth Circuit’s Younger jurisprudence at
all.122
CONCLUSION
“No matter what goals one thinks abstention should achieve, the lower
courts’ ability to fulfill those objectives can work only as long as they understand
when to abstain and when not to abstain from hearing a case.”123 The differences
between the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Brown and the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Planet serve as a perfect example of the growing inability of the
federal judiciary to fulfill the goals of Younger abstention. The tension created
by two circuits applying the same law—or rather, applying the same nonbinding
dicta in O’Shea—indicates the amount of confusion at play with respect to
Younger abstention. While the Seventh Circuit’s application of O’Shea furthers
the goals of the doctrine and has created a flexible framework through which
the circuit may analyze any Younger abstention case, the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the same case has created a more rigid rule that has led to
conflicts within its own circuit and an inability to effectively maintain notions
of comity and federalism. Brown was the only case of the two submitted to the
Supreme Court for review and certiorari was denied on October 15, 2019.124
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit’s decision to abstain in Brown stands. The
Supreme Court may have felt that the split between the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits was not sufficiently problematic to warrant review; however, the
Court’s denial of certiorari implies that the Seventh Circuit was indeed correct
in framing comity and federalism as the guiding principles of Younger abstention
and that “O’Shea abstention” is not a proper extension of Younger. Nevertheless,
the circuit split—and the lack of clarity as to the necessity of comity and
federalism in a Younger analysis—remains. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
should take its next opportunity to establish firmly that Younger abstention
requires a thorough analysis of comity and federalism, thus reinforcing the
principled underpinnings of our federal republic.

121. See Miles v. Wesley, 801 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We have stated that generally,
when ‘principles of federalism, comity, and institutional competence’ are implicated, a federal court
‘should be very reluctant to grant relief . . . .’” (quoting L.A. Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 703
(9th Cir. 1992))).
122. See supra Part III.
123. Bedell, supra note 5, at 959.
124. Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, No. 18-1203, 2019 WL 5150484 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019)
(mem.), denying cert to 908 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2018).
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